

# VF-Atak

Virus Flood Attack on Desktop  
Anti-Virus Programs

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# Urban legend

- On-access anti-virus program failed to stop (detect) an old and already known virus
  - 99.99% an user error
  - Definition or engine problem
  - Anti-virus program updating
- If problem exists window of opportunity is very short

# Birth of VF-Atak

- DoS
- How anti-virus programs behave under extreme load
- Remote attack

# So we decided to try

- Two computers
  - ATAcKer
  - DeFeNDER
- Windows XP Professional
  - SP2
  - Fully patched with latest patches

# So we decided to try

Computer I (ATAK)  
VF-ATAK.BAT

copy DFND.BAT  
execute DFND.BAT  
wait a moment

loop

copy EICAR.COM  
end loop

Computer II (DFND)  
VF-DFND.BAT

loop


execute EICAR.COM  
end loop



# Oops – it works!

Access denied Access denied Access denied Access denied  
Access denied Access denied Access denied Access denied  
Access denied Access denied Bad Command or file  
name **EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-  
FILE!**Access denied Access denied Bad Command  
or file name Access denied Access denied Access  
denied Access denied Access denied Access denied  
Access denied Access denied Access denied Access  
denied Access denied Access denied Access denied  
Bad Command or file name...

# Attack was not "smooth"



# “Naughty” errors

General failure reading drive C  
Abort, Retry, Fail?

Retry – same error again

Abort – continue attack

Fail – end script

# Be warned

- Attack requires attacker to have administrative rights on defender computer
  - Is that a *problem* at all?
  - Not required for “standalone” version
- Desktop alerting set to off

# Testing

- 10.000 writes of EICAR.COM
  - Several times in the row
- Clean OS image restored before each test

# Anti-virus programs performance

- One consistently passing
  - Passed all trials
- One consistently failing
  - Failed all trials
- Other failing more or less often
- Some programs displayed erratic behaviour

# Anti-virus programs performance

- Time to complete the test was from several minutes to two hours
- From one to several hundred infections

# Testing issues

- Consistency
  - Number of passes/fails
  - “Seriousness” of fails
  - Performance over time
- No live viruses
- Use of Command Prompt
- .COM executable
  - Not a true Windows application
  - File size

# More testing issues

- Each anti-virus program unique
- Default program configuration
- Number of anti-virus programs used
- Personal firewall
  - Circumvented with modified, “binary” attack
- Anti-virus programs should not upgrade during test

# Evolution of ATAKs

- Simple
- Multi-stream
- Binary
- One computer only
- Could be written in script, Java, C, etc.
- Web/Internet based attack

# What VF-Atak means?

- This is not a test, but *proof of a concept*
- Method is simple, but could be improved
- It seems that a number of applications is affected
- Tells something about performance
- Could pose a risk and could be exploited

# What Microsoft thinks?

I have reviewed your paper and noticed it says, "Everything was done under administrative account to simulate real world - too many desktop users already work under power or admin rights. Also, virus writers are quite capable of finding a way to elevate privileges." If I understand correctly, this exploit requires the attacker to already have administrative privileges on the victim's machine. If that is the case, the attacker already has full control of the system, would not need to use this particular vector, and could already cause any amount of damage. I agree too many users run with administrative privileges, but that does not make a vulnerability. Also, if an attacker has some other method of elevating privileges, then that may constitute a vulnerability and we would investigate that vector separately.

# What Microsoft thinks?

I believe I understand your methodology for non-administrative exploits. It seems to me, however, that it still requires a user to run code. If a user chooses to run code, that application or script can take any action the user is authorized to do. This is also mentioned in the essay to which I linked yesterday, and is one of the reasons why we recommend running software only from trusted sources. Trojan horses that attempt to run code are common and one of the reasons our email software blocks executable attachments. In the event your exploit code is put on a machine through a dropper of some sort, that dropper may be exploiting a vulnerability, but would not be the vulnerability itself.

# What do we think?

- This is most probably a problem of integration of the anti-virus program and Microsoft OS
- Also, it could be a problem of quality control
- Anti-virus companies should test and remedy the issue

What do you think?

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